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RESPONSE

Numbers, Motivated Reasoning, and
Empirical Legal Scholarship
CAROLYN SHAPIRO†
In Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group
Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment, the authors
explain that they are concerned that justices might be more
likely to protect the speech of litigants with whom they
sympathize ideologically or whom they view as being on the
same team.1 Starting from the premise that liberal justices
are inherently more likely to support First Amendment
claims and conservative justices are more likely to reject
them, they find systematic departures from this baseline
depending on the speakers or the content of the speech.2 In
his comprehensive critique of Do Justices Defend the Speech
They Hate?, Todd Pettys provides numerous reasons why the
authors’ conclusions must be taken with a grain of salt.3 In
this Response, I suggest that part of the problem for the
authors (as it is for much empirical legal scholarship more
† Carolyn Shapiro is an Associate Professor of Law at IIT Chicago-Kent College
of Law. She is currently on leave from that position and is serving as the Illinois
Solicitor General. The opinions expressed in this essay are hers alone and do not
reflect the views or positions of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.
1. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jerffrey A. Segal, Do Justices
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment, 2-3 available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias].
2. See generally id.
3. See generally Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and The
Court’s Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L.
REV. 1 (2015).
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generally) stems from an inaccurate placement of ideology in
opposition to an ideal of legal neutrality and a static notion
of the ideological valence of various issues.
As I have argued elsewhere, many cases decided by the
Supreme Court involve indeterminate constitutional or
statutory language, a lack of clear precedent, and competing
values and interests.4 How the justices resolve those cases
inevitably involves weighing values and making judgments.5
One can call those types of determinations ideological,
subjective,6 or something else; one can disagree—
vehemently—with the decisions and reasoning of particular
justices and particular cases; and one can even argue that
some justices appear to be more aggressive than others (even
inappropriately aggressive) in their decisions, in making
broad statements with strong ideological implications, or in
declining to defer to the other branches of government or to
precedent. But we cannot look seriously at the work of the
Court and claim that the hardest cases the justices confront
have legally neutral answers that can be objectively
determined. And if we are honest about that reality, then we
have to admit that, to some degree, it is the justices’ job to
make decisions that inherently have some ideological
content.7 What we should be arguing about, then, is the
nature of those ideological judgments and the extent to which
they are and should be manifest in both case outcomes and
the content of opinions.8
4. See Carolyn Shapiro, Claiming Neutrality and Confessing Subjectivity in
Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 455, 457-58, 471-72
(2013); Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 81, 126-28 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Context of Ideology]. In Context of Ideology, for example, I used Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), as an example,
explaining that the key texts—the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)—were indeterminate, requiring the justices to
make “political judgments, informed by their value-laden understanding of the
meaning of Brown.” Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra, at 127.
5. See Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 127.
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 258, 289 (2008).
7. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 126.
8. Id. at 122.
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Put in the context of the First Amendment cases
examined in In-Group Bias,9 this concern suggests to me that
the authors have framed their question in the wrong way.
The issue may be not so much whether the justices are biased
towards members of their favored groups, but to what extent
the balance of competing values and interests leads to
different results for First Amendment claims in different
contexts.10 Pettys suggests as much in his discussion of
Justice Alito’s votes in the campaign finance cases.11 Noting
that in one case, Justice Alito voted in favor of the First
Amendment rights of a Democratic claimant, Pettys says,
“Justice Alito himself would surely say he has a nonpartisan
view of political speech and the First Amendment, and this
view renders campaign-finance restrictions especially
vulnerable to constitutional attacks, no matter whom those
restrictions benefit or burden in a given case.”12 In other
words, under this view, Justice Alito is balancing various
considerations and values in the campaign finance context.
Agree or disagree with the balance he strikes, or accuse him
of striking a balance that in general favors his political
compatriots, but I do not believe that what he is doing can be
fairly characterized as in-group bias as the authors have
described it.
This perspective does not mean that one must simply
accept any Supreme Court decision as correct or justifiable.13
One can certainly argue that competing values play an
inappropriate role in some cases or for some justices. For
example, many have argued that for some justices, their
antipathy to reproductive rights inappropriately leads them
to vote in favor of the First Amendment rights of abortion
protesters.14 But it is one thing to say that these justices are
9. See Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, at 5-6.
10. See Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 82-85, 110.
11. Pettys, supra note 3, at 66-67.
12. Id. at 66.
13. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 128.
14. For critiques of McCullom v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), see, e.g.,
Trevor Bumis, Injordinances: Labor Protests, Abortion-clinic Picketing, and
McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 167, 169 (discussing whether the
political ideology of certain justices causes them to view abortion protesters as
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allowing their views on one highly contested issue to affect
their analysis of the protesters’ First Amendment rights 15
and to argue about whether that is appropriate or not, and it
is another altogether to say that it is unconscious empathy
for the protesters themselves that leads the justices to
abandon their otherwise consistent (though ideological)
views of the First Amendment.16
Similarly, the authors explain that pro-First Amendment
positions have long been seen as liberal positions.17 And
although they acknowledge that increasingly, liberals are
more likely to vote in favor of regulation than they used to
be, and vice versa for conservatives, the authors appear to
believe that the ideological salience and valence of the First
Amendment itself is static across time and context.18 But this
is not so.19 To explain this idea, we can return to campaign
finance. Campaign finance, with all of the competing values
it presents, is unquestionably a hot-button political issue,
and in general, conservative justices have voted to strike
down regulations while the liberals have more often been in

more or less sympathetic); Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint
Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y
131, 133-35 140-51 (2008) (remarking on the general susceptibility of abortion
free speech cases to be influenced by the personal politics of individual justices);
Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech about Favored Rights:
Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the need for an Objective Speech
Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 179, 220-22 (2001) (noting the presence and
influence of political preferences in the Supreme Court decision Hill v. Colorado).
15. In fact, Justice Scalia has been explicit that he is doing exactly this. In Hill
v. Colorado, he explained that, because there was no the possibility of outlawing
abortion through the political process, abortion opponents had an even more
urgent need to get their message across to individual women. 530 U.S. 703, 74142 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, at 6.
17. Id. at 5.
18. See id.
19. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 94-97 (discussing Anna
Harvey and Michael Woodruff’s work).
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dissent.20 This is so regardless of who the plaintiff is.21 In this
context, then, the valence of the First Amendment issue itself
is the opposite of what the authors would predict. But this is
not because of the identity of the parties per se, but rather
because of the justices’ views about the regulation of money
in politics.22 Being in favor of regulation in this context is
simply not a conservative position in American politics today.
If there is some kind of bias at work in the campaign
finance cases,23 it may be that the justices vote for outcomes
that they believe are more favorable to the advancement of
their overall ideological views. And we cannot assume that if
such bias exists in the campaign finance context, similar
biases would be present in other types of First Amendment
cases that, for example, do not directly implicate partisan
politics.24 But evaluating these possibilities requires a much
more fine-grained analysis than simply looking at which
justices vote which way.25 Likewise, in the campaign finance
context, we can, for example, criticize the conservative
justices for defining corruption so narrowly that many of the
justifications for campaign finance regulation become
irrelevant.26 But as with the abortion protester cases, the
problem, if there is one, is not necessarily that the justices
have abandoned their First Amendment principles. It is that
we might disagree substantively with what those principles
are and how they interact with the justices’ views on other
important issues. That’s a conversation worth having.

20. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.
Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010);
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
21. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (plaintiff is conservative PAC); Davis,
554 U.S. 724 (plaintiff is democrat politician); Pettys, supra note 3, at 61-68
(citing Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (plaintiff is conservative PAC).
22. See Pettys, supra note 3, at 66-70.
23. See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
24. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 4, at 134.
25. See Pettys, supra note 3.
26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-09 (holding that only quid pro quo
corruption can be legitimately targeted by campaign regulation).

